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Abstract 
External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals based on prices of 
identical or comparable products in foreign countries. Suppose a foreign country (F) 
negotiates prices with a pharmaceutical firm while a home country (H) can either 
negotiate prices independently or implement ER based on the foreign price. We show 
that country H prefers ER if copayments in H are relatively high. This preference is 
reinforced when H’s population is small. Irrespective of relative country sizes, ER by 
country H harms country F. Our model is inspired by the wide European experience 
with this cost containment policy. Namely, in Europe, drug authorization and price 
negotiations are carried out by separate agencies. We confirm our main results in two 
extensions. The first one allows for therapeutic competition between drugs. In the 
second one, drug authorization and price negotiation take place in a single agency.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
External referencing (ER) consists in setting a price cap for pharmaceuticals, based on 
prices of identical or comparable products in other countries. The aim of this paper is 
to analyze the effects of adopting ER on the pricing mechanisms. This analysis allows 
us to identify the winners and the losers from such a policy. 
With very few exceptions, most countries in the industrialized world have 
implemented ER at some point of time. Indeed, the policy has been in place in all 
European countries except Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Malta and the UK. Puig-
Junoy (2004) states that “the conditions on the EU market are in effect weakening the 
use of [cost-based price regulation] and giving more importance to the observed price 
in other European countries (external reference pricing).” (p. 163.) Heuer et al. (2007) 
reach a similar conclusion from their formal empirical analysis. They explore whether 
countries engaging in ER suffer from delays in the launch of pharmaceutical products, 
a good proxy for the importance of ER. Despite the fact that they explore several cost-
containment policies as explanatory variables (therapeutic value, cost-effectiveness, 
and so on), it is suggestive that the dummy variable for the presence of ER is the only 
explanatory variable that is significant at the 5% level. Windmeijer et al. (2006) 
measure the effects of the implementation of ER in the Netherlands. They show that 
this policy resulted in considerably lower prices in general. Merkur and Mossialos 
(2007) simulate the effect of ER on drug prices in Cyprus and show that this effect is 
beneficial after identifying Cyprus as a high price country for pharmaceuticals. Both 
Anke (2008) and Stargardt & Schreyogg (2006) analyze the international drug price 
interdependencies resulting from the adoption of varying forms of ER. They also 
discuss implications in terms of strategic decisions by firms to sequentially launch 
drugs in different countries. 
These experiences raise the following question: What is the influence of the ER 
policy on the reference countries and the pharmaceutical firms? To tackle this 
question, we first need to understand the pricing mechanisms that are driven by ER. 
We use a model where a pharmaceutical firm (simply “the firm” henceforth) sells a 
drug in two countries, namely a home country (H) and a foreign country (F). Each 
country can either negotiate a price directly with the firm or engage in ER. If no 
country engages in ER, then each country negotiates prices independently of the 
2 
other. We refer to this situation as “independent price negotiations” (IPN henceforth). 
We assume that the firm is based on a third country, so that both the foreign and the 
home country will unambiguously benefit from any price decrease. We use the 
Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution (GNBS) to solve each negotiation problem (on 
GNBS, see Muthoo, 1999). 
We introduce some asymmetries between countries in the population sizes and levels 
of copayments. Without loss of generality, we assume that country H has the lowest 
copayment. We limit ourselves to these two sources of asymmetry between countries 
to conveniently identify the mechanisms associated with ER. We acknowledge that 
other sources of asymmetry may coexist and could be determinant to explain the 
setting of international prices, but their inclusion in our model would not enrich the 
analysis of the specific effects of ER. However, the influence of both country sizes 
and copayments should not be overestimated as they are but a subset of relevant 
determinants of drug pricing.1
In our main contribution we assume that countries are unable to threaten the firm with 
not authorizing the drug for sale in case of a negotiation failure. The only threat 
available to countries is that of not listing the drug for reimbursement. In other words, 
even if negotiations fail, the firm can still sell the drug at any price of its choice, but 
with no subsidy. This assumption is motivated by the fact that, in Europe, price-
negotiating agencies have a minor role in the authorization of drugs. We therefore say 
that in Europe we are in a “weak threats” scenario. We elaborate this point further in 
the next section. However, as an extension, we also analyze a situation where 
agencies can threaten to ban the drug altogether when negotiations fail, which we 
refer to as the “tough threats” scenario. Indeed, some countries outside Europe like 
Brazil or Canada are known to threaten firms with not authorizing drug sales if 
negotiations fail or if the firm does not accept ER. 
We analyze how the commitment by a country to engage in ER affects the 
negotiations in the reference country and ultimately determines the firm’s total profit. 
We do that in three different scenarios. Our central case focus on the weak threats 
                                                 
1 Other sources of asymmetries could be differences in income, in bargaining powers or in specific 
population needs, for example. 
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scenario and it ignores the existence of possible therapeutic substitutes. It constitutes a 
first step to understand the effects driven by ER only. We further extend our main 
analysis to account for competition between the firm’s pharmaceutical product and a 
therapeutic substitute that is already present on the market in both countries. This 
extension adds realism to our modeling approach. In particular, it makes the weak 
threats scenario compatible with the observation that, in most European markets, 
being excluded from the public funding may be almost as bad as being banned, since 
sales out of the positive list of reimbursed drugs are negligible if subsidized 
therapeutic substitutes are available. Another extension maintains the initial monopoly 
setting but allows for tough threats by the agencies. 
The main results of the paper are the following. First, under weak threats and no 
therapeutic competition, an ER policy by the home country increases the negotiated 
foreign price, which harms the foreign country. Second, despite this price increase, 
the home country prefers ER to an independent price negotiation if the consumer 
copayment in the home country is relatively high. However, this preference 
diminishes as the demand size grows in the home country relative to the foreign 
country, although this preference does not disappear. Third, when compared to the 
profits resulting from IPN, an ER policy brings an increase in the profits derived from 
the foreign country and a decrease in those derived from the home country. The 
second effect is strong enough so that overall profits decrease.  
All these results are confirmed for the case of therapeutic competition between drugs, 
except for the size effect that is absent because for simplicity we ignore the 
asymmetry in country size in this extension. 
As for the tough threats scenario, we show that our main insight –that the home 
country is benefited while ER harms the firm– still holds. However, in contrast to the 
weak threats scenario, the negotiated price in the foreign country is unaffected by ER, 
so that ER does not affect the foreign country.  
Before offering an intuitive explanation for our results, let us point out that it is not 
the aim of this paper to provide an explanation of why copayments differ from one 
country to the other. Certainly, we take copayments as given, carrying out our 
analysis for any possible configuration of copayments. Therefore, we are implicitly 
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assuming that it takes time to change copayments, whereas prices are negotiated in a 
more agile and case-by-case basis. Since copayments are the prices actually borne by 
consumers, issues of social equity, insurance, consumer externalities, and even 
savings in administrative costs are present in the setting of copayments. Moreover, the 
experience in the EU is that copayments are generally not dependent on each drug and 
that at most we observe different copayments for large groups of medications (say 
chronic versus acute treatments) set by law.  Notice that, again because copayment is 
the price borne by the consumer, it is in the copayment negotiation where the usual 
price discrimination issues would play a decisive role. By taking copayments as given 
our analysis constitutes a necessary first step in a more ambitious agenda of analyzing 
the reimbursement system as a whole. 
Let us now offer some intuition for our results. External referencing under weak 
threats makes the firm more aggressive towards the foreign country. We explain this 
as follows. A negotiation failure would be transmitted to the home country providing 
the corresponding additional disagreement payoff to the firm. A negotiation success 
would be transmitted in the same way to the home country providing an additional 
payoff to the firm again. However, the difference between success and failure payoffs 
decreases because the demand in country H is proportionally lower than in country F 
when negotiations succeed, due to different copayments. Therefore, the price needs to 
be higher for the firm not to prefer a negotiation failure. As the size of the home 
country increases, this effect is reinforced. This explains why ER becomes less and 
less attractive for the home country as its size becomes more important. The reason 
why this does not happen under tough threats (i.e., under tough threats negotiations in 
the foreign country are unaffected by ER) is that the threat point in the home country 
negotiation is the same regardless of the presence or absence of ER. To see this, 
suppose that ER is absent. Then if negotiations in the foreign country fail, the drug is 
banned so the firm makes no profits. Suppose that ER is present. If negotiations in the 
foreign country fail, the drug is banned in both countries, so again the firm makes no 
profits.  
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Apart from the works by Windmeijer et al. (2006) and Heuer et al. (2007) mentioned 
above, there are several empirical studies that analyze the impact of price regulation.2 
Unfortunately, more than exploring the effects of ER in isolation, most empirical 
studies aim at determining the effect of price controls in general. The empirical 
implication of our model (the effects of demand size, consumer copayment, and the 
separation of authorization and subsidization decisions) might serve as a guide for 
future empirical studies on the effects of ER as a cost control policy. 
The paper is organized as follows. A description of the European experience with ER 
is provided in Section 2. The model is described in Section 3. In Section 4 we provide 
the solution to the benchmark case in which each country negotiates the price with the 
pharmaceutical firm independently of the other country. In Section 5 we introduce the 
possibility that one country adopts a weak-threats ER policy, and we analyze its 
effects. In Section 6 we extend the analysis to therapeutic competition and in Section 
7 to the tough-threats scenario. Section 8 concludes. All the proofs are in the 
appendix. 
2. THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
Let us now overview the many instances of ER that one can find in Europe.3 These 
cases motivate our assumption that countries cannot threaten not to authorize drugs 
for sale if price negotiations fail or if the firm rejects the ER policy.  
Many countries in Europe have implemented ER. However, not only the policy details 
differ from country to country, but are also changed often. For instance, in Denmark, 
foreign prices were used to determine the reimbursement price for drugs with the 
same ATC-code, but this policy has been discontinued recently, and has been replaced 
by non-price controls. In Sweden, ER was discontinued in 2002. Hence, the situation 
is, to say the least, volatile and the examples given below are only valid as of the time 
of writing this section. 
                                                 
2  On the effects of regulation on price see, for instance, Danzon and Chao (2000a, 2000b). On the 
effects of regulation on launch delays see Danzon, Wang and Wang (2005) and Kyle (2007).
 
3 There are countries outside Europe that also have implemented ER: Brazil (lowest price); Canada 
(median price); Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (average price). 
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As for inter-country differences, some administrations use the prices of other 
countries to construct an average reference price, whereas others take as a reference 
the minimum price. Among the first ones, some use a large list of referenced foreign 
countries. For instance Austria uses prices from Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. Finland adds to 
the previous list prices from Austria, Belgium, Ireland, and Norway. Also, among 
countries using average prices, others use prices from just a handful of countries. For 
instance, in the Netherlands, the maximum price for a drug is established as an 
average of the prices of the same drug in Germany, France, UK, and Belgium. In 
Switzerland, the drug price should not exceed the average of the prices in Germany, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK. Other countries that take averages of other 
countries’ prices are Austria, Belgium, Italy, Lithuania and Norway. 
As mentioned, some countries take the minimum instead of the average price. France 
uses the lowest price among Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. Other countries using 
the same method are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, 
Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, ex-Serbia-Montenegro, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
In summary, out of all European Countries, only Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Malta 
and the UK have not had an ER policy, even though Cyprus is now considering its 
implementation.4
Importantly for our model, there are reasons to believe that most European 
experiences correspond to the weak threats scenario. The reason is simple. In Europe, 
drug authorization and price negotiation are separate processes carried out by 
independent agencies, based on different criteria, and with different time horizons.  
As Heuer et al. (2007) point out, “[W]ith the introduction of the European Medicines 
Evaluation Agency (EMEA) in 1995, the EU Member States wanted to harmonize 
access to the pharmaceutical market” so that “[...] companies benefit from a larger 
market after authorization.” (p. 2). As for Switzerland, a non-EU state, Paris and 
Docteur (2007) report, “to be launched on the Swiss market, pharmaceutical products 
have to be approved by the Swissmedic [...]. This authorization is valid for 5 years.” 
                                                 
4 See Cyprus Association of Pharmaceutical Companies (2005). 
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In contrast, “The Federal Office of Public Health (OFSP) regulates both inclusion in 
the positive list and pricing of reimbursed pharmaceuticals.” The Swiss case is also 
interesting because the ER policy makes the threat explicit: according to the Health 
Insurance Law (1996) a 'positive list' of reimbursed pharmaceuticals was introduced. 
For a drug to be included in this positive list, its price should not exceed the average 
of the prices in Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK. This exactly 
corresponds to our weak-threats scenario. Equally explicit is the Spanish case.  
According to the Law 29/2006, the drugs that are subsidized by the National Health 
System are subject to ER, and in these cases the maximum producer price for drugs 
will be set taking into account “the average price of EU member states that are not 
subject to exceptional or transitory regimes of industrial property rights.” (Art. 90.) 
3. THE MODEL 
The players in this game are a pharmaceutical firm and the health authorities of two 
countries, H (home country) and F (foreign country). We refer to these players as the 
firm and the agencies. The firm sells a drug in both countries. It holds a patent for the 
drug in both countries and produces at no variable cost.5 In sections 4, 5, and 7 we 
assume that the firm does not face competition from any close substitutes, while in 
Section 6 we relax this assumption. 
Both agencies operate a positive list of reimbursed pharmaceuticals. If the drug is 
listed for reimbursement in country i, patients pay a fixed and exogenous copayment 
, as long as price is above copayment. If the price is below the copayment we 
assume that the out-of-pocket payment Z
iC
{ }PCMinZ ,=
CP −
P
                                                
i, i = F, H, is the price itself (i.e., there are no 
taxes). Formally, 
iii , i = F, H. 
The difference between the price and the copayment, , if positive, is 
reimbursed by the agency to the firm. If the drug is not listed for reimbursement then 
the patients pay the full price of the drug, .  
ii
i
 
5 The assumption that variable costs are negligible can be sustained empirically. Moreover, our analysis 
can be extended to situations with constant returns to scale. Having a positive marginal cost would only 
involve more complicated calculations, while in essence the results would be the same. 
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We assume that aggregate demand in country F is given by , with , 
. Note that by assuming that copayments are fixed, demand is 
independent of the price as long as the drug is listed for reimbursement and its price is 
above the copayment. Aggregate demand in country H is KD(Z
)(ZD 0)(' <ZD
0)('' ≤ZD
F F
F
H). In other words, 
country H is a K-replica of country F, with K > 0 but not necessarily larger than one.6 
We say that country H has size K while country F has size one.  
As mentioned above, in sections 4, 5, and 6 we deal with the monopoly case. We 
denote by PP )(PPDM the monopoly price, which maximizes . Notice that PMP
MPCC <<
MP>
)(ZDP )(ZKDP
                                                
 is the 
same for both countries (and therefore independent of country size) due to two 
assumptions: zero variable costs (and in general due to constant returns to scale gross 
of sunk costs), and country H being a K-replica of country F.  
The following assumption reflects another asymmetry between the two countries.  
Assumption 1. If the drug is listed for reimbursement in both countries, patients pay 
less in country F than in country H, and they pay less than the monopoly price, PM, in 
both countries. In other words: .  HF
Assumption 1 only rules out the case were the two copayments coincide. Note also 
that if C , this is tantamount to the drug being delisted. i
Countries F and H have different aggregate demands for two reasons. One is country 
size. The other is that, as long as country prices are larger than copayments, even if an 
individual in F has the same demand function as another in H and even if factory 
prices are the same in the two countries, the latter individual will demand less due to 
the higher copayment. 
The pharmaceutical firm aims at maximizing its joint profit from both countries, with 
 being profit in country F and  being profit in country H. FF HH
 
6 Suppose that, as for the individual demand function for the drug, there are T different types of 
individuals in country F, t = 1, 2, …, T. We are assuming that if there are nt agents of type t in country 
F then there are Knt agents of exactly the same type in country H, for all t = 1, 2, …, T. Assuming that 
H is a K-replica of F simplifies our analysis without giving up realism when considering countries that 
have similar distributions of socio-economic categories.  
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We assume that, in each country i, copayments are exogenously set beforehand by 
some outside player (say the Government or the Parliament of this country). Hence, as 
explained in the introduction, we do not aim at studying what the optimal copayment 
Ci should be. Therefore, the agency only bargains for low prices with firms in return 
for reimbursement rights. We believe this encompasses most real world cases.7
We assume that the agency is given the following mandate by the outside player: She 
should negotiate prices with the firm in order to maximize net consumer surplus 
minus the public costs of provision. Hence, the agency’s objective function does not 
include the profits of the firm. We believe this assumption to be in accordance with 
reality, especially in countries with a few or small pharmaceutical firms. Another 
motivation might be that the outside player finds it beneficial to delegate the 
bargaining over price to a more aggressive negotiator.  
Now, in a market of size Ki, with Ki = { , we define the net consumer surplus as:  }K,1
⎤⎡ )(ZD i
)()()( ZDZPKZCSK ⋅−−
                                                
⎥⎥⎦⎢⎢⎣
⋅−= ∫ − )()()(
0
1
iiiii ZDZdqqDKZCSK .
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The objective function of the agency of a country of size Ki is: 
iiiiii .
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7 Some countries rely on the so-called “tiered pricing” whereby lower prices result in the drug enjoying 
a higher subsidy. Our model amounts to a very simple tiered pricing mechanism. As it will be 
explained below, negotiation failure results in the drug not being listed for subsidization. Hence, only 
two tiers are present: a subsidy P − Ci or no subsidy at all. 
8 We consider the consumer surplus as a measure of health benefits as it is linked to the willingness to 
pay for the drug.  
9 Notice that, if Pi < Ci then Zi = Pi and the objective function becomes Ki.CS(Pi). Notice also that, if Pi 
> Ci then Zi = Ci and the objective function of the agency is decreasing in Ci. Although we take 
copayments as exogenous, it is useful to understand why this is so. Suppose that one increases the 
copayment so that demand is reduced by one unit. This has a negative effect on gross consumer surplus 
equal to the original copayment, as the unit that is no longer sold was enjoyed by the marginal 
consumer. However, it also has a positive effect, as total expenditures (consumer plus government’s) 
are reduced by the price. Since our premise was that copayment was below price, the assumed 
objective function increases. In consequence, if the agency were in charge of setting copayments, drug 
consumption would not be subsidized. However, as explained in the introduction, the outside player’s 
preferences may be quite different from those of the agency. 
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We model the negotiation process as a Nash bargaining game. We initially assume 
that the scenario is one with weak-threats. Namely, if negotiations fail in a country, 
the drug is not listed for reimbursement but the firm is allowed to market the product 
in that country. Of course, the firm will do so at the monopoly price, MP . If the drug 
is not listed for reimbursement, there are no public expenses associated with 
subsidizing the drug and the objective function of the government reduces to 
Ki )( MP
 (M PDD = , (M PCSCS = nd MM P=π
ote )DD = , DD ′=′ , CS = nd SCSC =′  
H. 
4. INDEPENDENT PRICE NEGOTIATIONS 
 MK π  constitute the 
disagreement payoffs of the agency and the firm   
The Nash bargaining problem for a country i of size Ki = { }K,1  is: 
   
 
 
CS , the value of the net consumer surplus at the monopoly price.  
Finally, the agencies of both countries have the same bargaining power as the firm, 
thus equal to ½ for each bilateral negotiation. Our results continue to hold for any 
distribution of bargaining powers among agencies and the firm as long as the relative 
negotiation powers of the agencies are identical and not too high. 
Throughout the text we denote )M )M  a MD . 
We also den (C C )( iC  a )( iC  for i = F,ii )( ii i CS i ′
Here we present our main benchmark case in which each country carries a price 
negotiation with the pharmaceutical firm, independently from the other country, and 
in the scenario with weak threats.10  Therefore, Mi CSK ⋅  and i
, respectively.
Maximize
Pi
{ } { }])([ln21])()()([ln211 MiiiMiiiiii ZDPKCSZDZPZCSKNB π−+−−−=  
[ ] ])(ln[2 iiiiii 1])()()(ln[21ln MMi ZDPCSZDZPZCSK π−+−−−+=  
subject to: .       (1) 
                                                
 { }iii PCMinZ ,=
 
10 This analysis heavily draws from Jelovac (2003). 
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It is worth noting that in the bargaining problem of any country, we assume that the 
agency places no value on the consumer surplus or the public expenses of the other 
country. Note also that the size of the country, Ki, only constitutes a level effect in this 
bargaining problem, and in consequence will not affect the final price. By solving (1) 
we obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 1. When both countries independently negotiate the price with the firm, then 
(i) the resulting price in each country i, i = F, H is: 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
+
−
+=
i
M
i
M
i
ii DD
CSCS
CP
π
2
1* .     (2) 
(ii) This price is increasing in the level of copayment, Ci, and 
(iii)  for all i = F, H. ii CP >
*
The profits per capita in the bargaining solution in country i are:  
{ }1**
'
MM
iiiiii CSCSDCDP ππ +−+== 2 . 
These profits decrease in Ci, since  implies ii DCS −= 02´/ <=∂∂ iiii DCCπ
*
CC <
MM **
C
)( iCS
MM
. 
Since  by Assumption 1, profits per capita are larger in country F.  HF
Part (i) of Lemma 1 implies the following equality:  
iiiiii DPDCPCSCS π−=−−− )( .      (3) 
Equation (3) illustrates that the surplus generated by the negotiation above the 
disagreement point is equally split between the country and the firm, as usual when 
bargaining powers are equal. 
In the bargaining problem, the disagreement point does not depend on the copayment 
i. Hence, the effect of the copayment on the negotiated price is only due to its effect 
on the surplus generated by the negotiation above the disagreement point. Let  
denote this surplus, with: 
iiii CSDCCSCS π−−+=)( .      (4) 
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This surplus is decreasing in : . iC 0)( <′=′++′=′ DCDCDSCCS
** PP <
M MK π)1( +
iiiiiii
As the copayment increases, there is less to be split between the two parties and the 
negotiated solution converges to the monopoly outcome. The public costs of the 
subsidy decrease, and the agency can afford higher negotiated prices. At the same 
time, as the copayment increases, there is less for the firm to gain by negotiating and 
hence it requires a larger price. This explains Lemma 1. What follows is a direct 
corollary of Part (ii) of Lemma 1. 
Corollary 2. For any Ki and with independent negotiations, the negotiated price in 
the country with a large copayment exceeds the negotiated price in the country with a 
small copayment: . HF
Therefore, when considering the possibility of adopting ER, country H is a natural 
country for adopting ER and country F for being the reference country. In the next 
section we analyze this case and we discuss whether it is indeed the equilibrium of a 
game where both countries have the choice of whether to implement an ER or not.  
5. EXTERNAL REFERENCING IN THE WEAK-THREATS SCENARIO 
In this section we consider the effects of an ER policy by H based on the price of 
country F. Our aim is to explain how H’s ER affects the bargaining outcome in 
country F and to investigate whether it is in the interest of H to implement this policy. 
Let us first specify what happens in the case of failed negotiations in F. As we are 
under the weak-threat scenario, we assume that if negotiations in country F fail, both 
H and F cease to reimburse the drug but still allow the firm to sell the drug at a full 
price chosen by the firm. Hence the disagreement payoffs of F’s agency and the firm 
become, respectively, CS  and . Similarly, we assume that, if the firm 
decides not to respect the ER policy and sells the drug in country H at a price higher 
than the price cap, H ceases to reimburse the drug but still allows the firm to sell the 
drug at any price chosen by the firm.  
The following table summarizes the types of ER that we analyze in the paper, 
anticipating the tough threats case developed in Section 7. It shows, for each type of 
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threats and possible contingencies, the price paid by patients and the price received by 
the firm.  
[TABLE I AROUND HERE] 
The next lemma provides the solution to the Nash Bargaining Problem in country F 
when H uses the price in country F as reference. 
Lemma 3. If 
MM
FFF
M
FH CSCSDC
DD
π
π
+−+
>
2
,    (5) 
which holds if CH is not too high, then the negotiated price in country F is given by 
  ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
+
+
−
+=
HF
M
F
M
F
F
ER
KDD
K
D
CSCS
CP
π)1(
2
1 .   (6) 
Condition (5) ensures that, when solving the Nash Bargaining Problem in country F, 
we can restrict attention to prices that lie above that which the firm would accept as 
reference in country H. Intuitively, if the demand in country H evaluated at the 
copayment in H is high enough, the firm benefits a lot from accepting the ER price 
cap offered by agency H. 
Lemma 3 allows us to write the following equality: 
{ }MFFERF
F
HF CSDCPCSD −−− )(  
KDD +
{ }))1()( MER KKDDP πHF +−+= .       (7) 
Equation (7) illustrates that the total surplus generated by the negotiation above the 
disagreement point is split between country F and the firm in the ratio 1 to 
1>
F
HF
D
+ KDD . 
This shows that the implicit negotiation power of the firm is higher when country H 
engages in ER as compared to independent negotiations.  
14 
It is also interesting to analyze how changes in country H’s size K affect the outcome 
of the negotiation in F on the face of ER. A raise in K affects the bargaining between 
F and the firm in two ways. First, the pie to be shared between both parties is larger. 
Hence there is an outwards shift in the frontier of the problem. Second, the firm has a 
stronger disagreement payoff whilst F’s disagreement payoff remains the same. The 
next proposition tells us the outcome of these two effects. 
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumption 1 and condition (5) hold. Then: 
(i)   and this difference increases in K. 0* ≥− FER PP
(ii)  . This difference decreases in K and converges to an 
asymptote as K tends to infinity. This asymptote decreases in the difference C
0* <− HER PP
H 
− CF. Therefore, the difference between  and  decreases monotonically 
as C
ERP *HP
F tends to CH. 
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 1. It implies that H prefers to commit to an ER 
policy rather than to engage in independent price negotiations with the firm. It also 
implies that this preference diminishes as the size of country H increases and as 
copayments converge, but it is always positive if CH > CF. However, as a direct result 
of the adoption of ER in country H, the price negotiated in country F raises. This is 
explained by the change in the differences between failure and success payoffs of F 
and the firm. Moreover, as K increases the negotiated price in country F raises, but 
never to be so high that H loses out by choosing the ER policy rather than 
independently negotiating with the firm. Public expenses as well as the firm’s profit in 
country H are lower. The opposite holds in country F.  
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
Notice that consumers in either country are not affected by the ER policy since they 
pay a fixed copayment. In contrast, total profits of the firm decrease. Formally, 
Proposition 5. Under Assumption 1 and if condition (5) holds, the total profits of the 
firm are lower when country H engages in ER, that is, 
HHFFHF
ER KDPDPKDDP **)( +<+ . 
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Consequently, the sum of public expenses in both countries also decreases, implying 
that the decrease in H’s expenses compensates for the extra expenses in country F. 
This means that if country H wanted to fully compensate F for her “free riding”, she 
could do so and still achieve higher welfare than under independent negotiations.  
This concludes the analysis of the case where H engages in ER whereas F does not, to 
which we refer to as “the natural case” in view of the result in Corollary 2. It is now 
legitimate to wonder whether such a distribution of roles would constitute an 
equilibrium in a game where all countries have the choice between negotiating and 
adopting ER. Does any country benefit by unilaterally deviating from the case we 
study? Consider first a deviation by country H. Such a deviation would take us to the 
case where both countries conduct independent negotiations with the firm, as in 
Section 4. According to part (ii) of Proposition 4, this deviation is not in H’s interest. 
Consider now a deviation by country F leading de facto to a bilateral adoption of ER. 
Whether such a deviation is beneficial or not to country F depends on the rules 
underlying a bilateral ER. To illustrate this point, let us take two alternative 
interpretations of a bilateral ER policy. 
Assume first that bilateral ER reverts to IPN, then country F is indeed better off 
deviating to ER because  by part (i) of Proposition 4. Hence our 
“natural case” does not constitute a Nash equilibrium.
0* ≥−ER PP
                                                
F
11
Suppose instead that a bilateral adoption of ER entails setting a mechanical price cap 
equal to the other country’s price with no other restriction. Then the firm is free to set 
very high prices provided they are equal across countries. In that case, country F is 
worse off deviating to ER and our supposed natural case does constitute a Nash 
equilibrium. 
To sum up, countries’ choice between ER and direct negotiation is highly sensitive to 
the modalities of the bilateral ER. This sensitivity is interesting in itself and 
constitutes a promising area for future research. It ties naturally with the issue of 
strategic launch delays of drugs since it is in principle difficult to apply an ER 
 
11 We can formally show that in that specific case, no Nash equilibrium exists when both countries 
simultaneously chose between ER and direct negotiation. The proof of this statement is available from 
the authors upon request. 
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formula when some of the reference prices have not yet been observed. A dynamic 
model will be needed to deal with these important issues. 
Another interesting issue related to ER is that of parallel trade of drugs. Indeed, both 
ER and parallel trade result in the convergence of international prices. However, the 
mechanisms leading to converging prices are different. The convergence in prices due 
to parallel imports is the best response of pharmaceutical firms to the competition 
they face from parallel imports. In contrast, ER is imposed by agencies and this forces 
price convergence.  
Another difference between ER and parallel trade arises if one considers the 
possibility of launch delays, which is beyond the scope of this paper. The timing of 
drug launches in different countries represents a strategic action for the firm when 
countries engage in ER. As discussed in Anke (2008) and in Stargardt & Schreyogg 
(2006), the firm is better off launching its drug in naturally high-price countries first, 
to influence prices in other countries to its advantage. Such strategic behavior has less 
reason to appear with parallel trade only. Indeed, a sequential launching of drugs 
might at most postpone the start of parallel trade but would not influence prices in the 
long run. 
Another issue is that of the coexistence of both phenomena. In our model, ER leads to 
uniform pricing across countries because it is based on the price of a single reference 
country. More generally, when ER is based on the average of several countries 
prices,12 less-than-full convergence might be observed. As noted by Maskus (2001), 
goods that are parallel imported may not be perceived to be of the same quality 
between markets even if the producer placed them on the market originally, because 
of differences in packaging or guarantees. This difference in perception leads in 
Jelovac and Bordoy (2005) to the persistence of different prices among countries even 
when parallel imports are permitted. Thus, neither parallel trade nor ER necessarily 
lead to uniform prices. Therefore, there is scope for an ER policy in the presence of 
parallel imports and vice versa. However, having both parallel imports and ER 
simultaneously would result in a limited effect of each because of the presence of the 
                                                 
12 For instance, as mentioned in Section 2, in the Netherlands the ER price cap is an average of the 
prices in Germany, France, UK, and Belgium. 
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other. It might be interesting to empirically disentangle the effects of ER from those 
of parallel trade when both coexist, which is the case in the EU. 
6. EXTENSION TO THERAPEUTIC COMPETITION 
Suppose that there are two drugs, 1 and 2, that have similar therapeutic indications, 
each produced by a different firm, firm 1 and firm 2. This includes the case where 
drug 1 and drug 2 are off patent and one is the generic substitute of the other, although 
the consumer perceives them to be different.13 Consistently with this therapeutic 
equivalence, if both drugs are listed then consumers in any given country face the 
same copayment, although this copayment may differ among countries. Hence let Ci 
be the copayment for these drugs in country . We maintain the 
assumptions that C
{ HFi ,∈ }
                                                
H > CF and that marginal production costs are zero.  
To avoid the complex issue of simultaneous negotiations with externalities,14 we 
assume that price negotiations for drug 2 were conducted in the past and were 
successful, so drug 2 is already listed in both the foreign and the home markets. In 
other words, for all i = H, F; the health authority in country i has already committed to 
pay the competitor the price p2i, whereas consumers pay the copayment Ci.15
All consumers place the same base value v > 0 to the consumption of either drug. 
However, the two drugs are horizontally differentiated á la Hotelling.16 Hence we 
represent consumers’ preferences over each of the two drugs as if each drug is located 
at either end of a line of length 1 and consumers are distributed uniformly along the 
line. The intensity of preference for one drug over another is measured by disutility 
 
13 See for instance Mestre-Ferrandiz (1999). We discuss the issue of consumer’s perceptions below. 
14 If an agency simultaneously negotiates with firms 1 and 2, the two negotiation processes are 
interlinked as the two drugs share the same market.  Notice that this issue is not present when the firm 
producing drug 1 negotiates with the two agencies in the absence of ER, since the markets are 
independent and agency in country H does not care about country F and vice versa.  
15 There are of course other possible negotiation histories in reference to the pricing of drug 2: success 
in H and failure in F, success in F and failure in H, or failure in both countries. We restrict attention to 
the case “success in both countries” in the spirit of many analyses of multilateral negotiations. See for 
instance Marshall and Merlo (2004) or Majer (2009). 
16 This Hotelling type of model is common in the literature. See for instance Brekke et al. (2007) or 
Miraldo (2009). 
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given by td, where d is the distance between the consumer’s ideal drug and the one 
he/she finally purchases. We assume that the value v is very large, so that we can 
restrict attention to equilibria where the market is fully covered. 
In order to have a well-defined problem we make a number of assumptions, which we 
group as follows to ease exposition. 
Assumption 2. (i) t > CH > CF; (ii) p2i > Ci; (iii) t  p≥ 2i   for all i = H, F. 
These assumptions play the following role. If the market for the two drugs was 
unregulated and the two drugs would compete in prices, the equilibrium would be that 
both prices are equal to t.17 Hence Part (i) ensures that the copayment is below such 
price. Part (ii) is in the same spirit, but in reference to the mill price for drug 2. Part 
(iii) ensures that the price of drug 2 in either country is not above the unregulated 
price t. 
6.1 Independent price negotiations 
Let us first analyze the case of independent negotiations, so that the country subscript 
i is dropped from the notation. The firm’s status quo is to sell the drug unsubsidized, 
knowing that it will engage in price competition with drug 2, whose consumers pay C. 
Demand for drug 1 becomes 
1
1
1 1 1
1
0 ;
1( , ) ;
2 2
1 .
if p C t
C pD p C if C t p C t
t
if p C t
> +⎧⎪
−⎪
= + − ≤ ≤ +⎨⎪
< −⎪⎩
 
Profits are therefore given by p1D1(p1,C). Assuming an interior solution, profits are 
maximized at 
 SQ
def
ptCp 11 2
=
+
= ,        (8) 
                                                 
17 See equation 7.7 in Tirole (1988) for the case of extreme differentiation and no production costs (a = 
b = c = 0 in his notation).
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where SQ stands for status quo. This status quo price is indeed interior and above the 
copayment of drug 2 by part (i) of Assumption 2.18 Demand is  
 D1 = (t + C) / (4t)  SQ
def
D1=
and profits are 
( ) SQdef
t
tC Π=+=Π
8
2
.        (9) 
It is interesting to note that status quo profits tend to zero if transportation costs and 
the rival’s copayment (consumer price) tend to zero. Hence this model converges to 
the tough threats scenario of next section if drug 2 is a good substitute of drug 1 (t 
small) and the copayment for a listed drug tends to marginal cost. In this case, 
removing a drug from the list of reimbursed drugs is almost as bad as banning its sale.  
We turn now to the health authority’s status quo in the negotiation. To further 
simplify the analysis, we assume that the health authority only cares about the base 
health benefit of the drug (v) and price. In other words, the agency disregards the 
disutility borne by individuals when they purchase a drug that is not their ideal one. 
One possible justification for this assumption is that disutility td might represent some 
misleading (i.e., persuasive) advertising that does not reflect true physical differences 
(Fehr and Stevik, 1998). Hence, perceived preferences for each drug dissipate once 
the drug is actually consumed, although they do of course affect demand, which is 
based on pre-consumption perceptions.  
The agency’s status quo payoff becomes ( ) , where 
the first term is the agency’s net surplus (consumer’s gross surplus v minus total -
consumer plus agency- outlay) arising from consumers who consume drug 1 and the 
second one from those consuming drug 2. After substituting prices and demands, this 
status quo point can be rewritten as 
( ) ( SQSQ DpvDpv 1211 1 −−+− )
                                                 
18 To see this; notice that C < t implies that the average p1 = (C + t)/2 must lie between C and t, and 
hence also between C – t and C + t.  
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( )2
2
3
8 4
def
SQt C t Cv
t t
+
−
− − =p H . (10) 
If instead negotiations are successful at price p1 then demand for the two drugs is the 
same and equal to 1/2 since consumers pay the same copayment C. Therefore the firm 
obtains  
(½) p1 
def
=  Π( p1). (11) 
The next lemma allows us to restrict attention to prices above the copayment.  
Lemma 6. The firm would reject any p1 < C. 
With successful negotiations, the health authority obtains 
( )1 2 1 2 12 2 2
defv p v p p pv H− − ++ = − = p .  (12) 
We can now present the Nash Bargaining Problem (NBP): 
( )( ) ( )( )
1
1 1
1 1ln ln
2 2
SQ SQ
p
Max H p H p− + Π − Π . 
The solution is 
( ) ( )
t
pCtCt
p IPN
4
2
2
1
−++
= .  (13) 
It is easy to check that Assumption 2 implies 1
IPNp > C and that 1 0
IPNp
C
∂
>
∂
, as in 
Lemma 1.  
In order to have a setting that is similar to the one in Section 4, that is, one where 
independent price negotiations lead to a higher price in the home country, we impose 
the following.  
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Assumption 3. ( ) ( ) ( ) MAXF
F
HHFH
F pCt
pCtCtCtp 22
22
2 =
−
−++−+
< . 
It is interesting to note that Assumption 3 ensures that   even when 
copayments are not higher in country H. 
IPN
H
IPN
F pp 11 <
6.2 External referencing 
Suppose that agency H engages in ER when pricing drug 1, using the price in F as a 
reference price. We now have to deal with the two countries simultaneously, so we 
need to restore the subindices indicating country. Recall that copayments for this 
therapeutic group in each country (CF, CH) as well as mill prices of drug 2 in each 
country (p2H, p2F) were set in the past. Hence we only need to find the negotiated price 
for drug 1 in F, or p1. Notice first that agency H’s success payoff as a function of p1 is 
the same function as in the previous subsection since agencies do not care about other 
countries’ payoffs. Hence, after duly replacing C by CF,  by , and pSQΠ SQFΠ 2 by p2F in 
(10) and (12), leading to  and (pSQFH FH 1), agency F’s stakes in the negotiation 
become (pFH 1) − . As for the firm, its status quo is to sell the drug unsubsidized 
in both countries, thus engaging in price competition with drug 2 in both countries. 
Hence, once we restore the country subindex , the profits become (see 
(9)):  
SQ
FH
{ HFi ,∈ }
( ) ( )
t
Ct
t
Ct HFSQ
H
SQ
F 88
22 +
+
+
=Π+Π . 
In case of success at price p1 in country F, the firm obtains this mill price in both 
countries. Consumers in F pay the same copayment CF for the two drugs, and 
consumers in H pay the same copayment CH for the two drugs. Hence demands are 
shared equally in both countries and the firm’s profit is given simply by 
11 2
1
2
1 pp =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+ . 
In the next lemma we provide the solution to the NBP.  
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Lemma 7. Assume that  
( ) ( ) MIN
F
def
F
FH
F pCt
CtCtp 2
22
2 =
−
+−+
> .    (14) 
Then the solution of the NBP in country F is given by 
  FF
SQ
H
SQ
F
ER p
t
Ctp 21 42
1
2
3 −
+Π+Π= .    (15) 
It is easy to check that the condition (14) is compatible with Assumption 3 and that 
(14) becomes less stringent the larger t is and/or the closer is CH to CF. As in Lemma 
3, this condition ensures that we can restrict attention to prices that lie above that 
which the firm would accept as reference in country H. The intuition is the following.  
Suppose  is small. Then the agency in F has a strong bargaining position vis à vis 
firm 1: the agency can always resort to drug 2 as a cheap alternative. Once the agency 
in F has a strong bargaining position, the negotiated price in F will be so low that the 
firm will reject it as price cap in H. 
Fp2
We now confirm that our main results continue to hold in this extension: ER benefits 
the referencing (high copayment) country and harms the referenced country as well as 
the firm. Formally show, 
Proposition 8. Suppose that ( )MAXFMINFF ppp 222 ,∈  so that both Assumption 3 and 
condition (14) hold. Then, 
IPN
H
ERIPN
F ppp 111 <<  and , ( ) ( ) ( ERIPNHIPNF ppp 111 2Π>Π+Π )
with  defined in Equation (11). ( )⋅Π
7. EXTENSION TO TOUGH THREATS 
As explained in the introduction, our main motivation is to provide insights into the 
European markets, where price negotiations have no bearing on the drug authorization 
decision (i.e. only weak threats are feasible). However, it is interesting to see that 
some of our main results remain even when agencies in charge of price negotiation 
can also threaten with a ban on the drug. In this section we assume that agencies in 
countries F and H are able to make such tough threats and we restrict our attention to 
the monopoly case.  
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In this case and with independent negotiations, a country’s agency does not authorize 
the drug for sale if the negotiation in this country fails. Similarly, country H does not 
authorize the drug for sale if it implements an ER policy and negotiations in country F 
fail. Notice that tough threats change the disagreement payoff of both the Nash 
bargaining problem under independent negotiations and the Nash bargaining problem 
in F when H engages in ER. 
Unfortunately, solving the model with tough threats at the same level of generality as 
the model with weak threats is quite complex. To illustrate this note that with tough 
threats and independent negotiations the disagreement point is no longer 
(CSM, pM), but (0,0). This means that it is difficult to rule out situations where price is 
so low that it falls below the copayment.  Hence the analysis needs to deal with the 
non-differentiability of the patients’ payment function. In contrast, under weak threats 
we avoid this non-differentiability because profits must lie above pM. 
In order to derive some explicit results, we restrict attention to the case of a 
monopolistic firm facing a linear demand.  More precisely, for a, y  > 0, let demand 
be given by 
D(Z) = (a - Z)/y. 
We also assume that CF = 0. This obviously guarantees that the price resulting from 
any negotiation taking place in country F is above the copayment in that country. This 
drastically reduces the number of cases and comparisons that one must address. Of 
course, we still assume that 0 =  CF < CH < PPM = a/2,  in order to have an interesting 
problem. 
These assumptions allow us to derive a sufficient condition ensuring that: 
i) The price resulting from the Nash bargaining problem with ER by H is above CH. 
ii) The price resulting from the Nash bargaining problem when H conducts 
independent price negotiations with the firm is also above CH. 
iii) Agency H is able to decrease prices using ER. Thus, one of the main results that 
we obtained under weak threats is maintained. 
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iv) In contrast to the weak threats scenario, under tough threats country F is 
unaffected by ER. In other words, the negotiated price in F is the same irrespective of 
whether H engages in ER or not. 
v) As a direct result of (iii) and (iv), overall firm’s profits decrease with ER. 
Let us formalize these results.  
Proposition 9.  If a > 4 CH  then 
4
α
==
ERIPN
F  PP  > CH. Moreover, 
ERHIPN
H P
CP >+=
44
α  and total firm’s profits are lower under ER. 
Notice that conclusions (i) through (v) are contained in the proposition. Condition 
a > 4 CH ensures that the willingness to pay for the drug in question is high enough so 
that agencies are willing to pay a relatively high price. This in turn ensures that when 
we solve the different negotiations (in H and in F under IPN, and in H alone when F 
adopts ER) we can restrict attention to prices that lie above the relevant copayment.  
This allows us to avoid the non-differentiabilities present in the objective function of 
the Nash Bargaining Problem.  
Another feature of ER under tough threats is that the negotiated price becomes 
independent of K.  Intuitively, when the threat point is a sales ban in both countries, 
the size of the home country ceases –trivially– to influence the threat point. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
Using a model where two countries differ only in their population size and 
subsidization policies, our most general result is that a country has an incentive to 
engage in ER if its copayment levels are high as compared to the other country’s. This 
preference dwindles as the relative size of the country engaging in ER increases. We 
have analyzed the effects of an ER policy by H on the negotiation in F, showing that 
ER increases the surplus to be shared between F and the firm. The idea is that the 
profits obtained by the firm in the home country, H, become part of the pie.  
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For the case of ER with weak threats, we can provide a clear empirical prediction that 
hinges on the relative size of the home country. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that 
the relative size of the home country is irrelevant as to the sign of the advantage of ER 
over independent negotiations, which is always positive. Only the size of the 
advantage is affected. In other words, should ER have some external and fixed cost 
that we have not taken into account,19 then ER would only be implemented if the size 
of the home country were not too large. In a nutshell, only small countries should be 
observed to engage in ER and/or ER should be based on prices in large countries (or a 
large group of countries). Our analysis yields an analogous prediction if one 
substitutes “large country” by “small copayment country” and vice versa. 
Our main results continue to hold when therapeutic competition is introduced in our 
model: ER benefits the country with high copayment while it harms the reference 
country as well as the pharmaceutical firm. 
With tough threats the firm suffers a harsher punishment in the case that negotiations 
fail. We show that if all countries are able to make tough threats the main result with 
weak threats turns out to be robust: ER benefits the home country and harms the firm. 
However, in contrast to the scenario with weak threats, the benefits derived from an 
ER policy cease to depend on relative country size. Moreover, the negative externality 
that ER inflicts on the foreign country disappears. 
We recognize that there may be other factors that condition price negotiations for a 
given reimbursement policy, like the prevalence of a given disease or risk mix (say 
population age), the lobbying activity of the pharmaceutical industry, and so on. 
Nevertheless, we believe that our analysis offers insights on the direction of the 
effects of an ER policy. The fact that the reference country could be harmed 
constitutes one of the main results of our analysis. This policy externality suggests the 
pharmaceutical pricing policies should be internationally coordinated. 
                                                 
19  For instance, some political cost. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Part (i) 
We first prove that P < Ci  is not feasible in the Nash Bargaining Problem in any 
country i = F, H: 
Notice that PD(P) < Π , since  and P)( MMM PDP≡ MPCP << i P
≥
M  maximizes 
PD(P). Hence, PD(P) is below the disagreement payoff for the firm for any P < C . 
Therefore, we can restrict attention to P C  so that 
i
i { }Z , ii iMin C P C= =  can be 
substituted into (1), which yields 
Maximize  
ip
[ ] ]ln[21])()(ln[21ln1 MiiMiiiiii DPCSDCPCCSKNB π−+−−−+=  (A1) 
The first order condition associated to (A1) can be written as: 
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Rearranging this expression, equation (2) in Lemma 1 is obtained. This is the solution 
to (A1) since (A1) is concave in P: 
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Part (ii) 
To check that Pi* is increasing in Ci, rewrite the first-order condition associated to 
(A1) as: 
( ) ( ) 0)( =−−−−− iiiiii DPCSDCPCS π** MM . 
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Applying the implicit function theorem to this expression and using , we 
obtain: 
ii DCS −=
′
ii
iiiiiii
i
i
DD
DPDCPDCS
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This is positive, since equation (2) implies 2
* i
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C
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Part (iii) 
P PWe now prove that , . By definition, , ii ≠∀ . 
Therefore, iC
i
M
M
i D
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Proof of Corollary 2 
By part (ii) of Lemma 1 and C . HF
Proof of Lemma 3  
Assume that P has been set in country F after successful negotiations. Then ER in H 
implies that the price cap imposed by the agency in H to the firm is P. The question is 
then whether the firm will accept this price cap in Country H. In a complement to this 
proof that is available upon request from the authors, we show that (i) the answer is 
yes if P is above threshold PPMIN = H
M DΠ , and (ii) that C  < PH MIN < . This 
implies that three separate intervals for P must be considered when F negotiates with 
the firm, since the formulae for negotiation payoffs are different in each interval. 
Namely, (i) P < C  < P
*
HP
F
MIN, where P is rejected by the firm in country H so consumers 
in H pay PMP  while consumers in F pay P;  (ii) CF   P  P≤ < MIN, where P is still 
rejected by the firm so consumers in H pay PPM while consumers in F pay C ; (iii) C  
 PMIN
F H
≤ P   P, where P is accepted by the firm in country H and consumers in F pay C≤ F 
while consumers in H pay CH. In the same complement available upon request 
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mentioned above, we show that, under condition (5), the Nash bargaining solution in 
F lies in interval (iii), that is, P  P≥ MIN .  We can now solve the NBP restricting P to 
be in interval (iii).  The problem becomes 
Maximize { }MINPP ≥  
{ } { }MFFMFFF KKDDPCSDCPCS π)1()(ln21)(ln21 +−++−−− . 
The first-order condition can be written as: 
M
FF
ER
F
F
CSDCPCS
D
−−−
− )(2
1
M
HF
ER
HF
KKDDP
KDD
π)1()(2
1
+−+
+
+   . 0=
Rearranging this expression, we obtain the formula for PPER given in equation (6).  
To show that this is indeed the solution we must prove that it lies above  and 
that the objective function is concave in P. We prove these two statements in the 
complement available upon request.  
MINP
Proof of Proposition 4.  
Step 1. Differentiating  with respect to CERP F we obtain: 
.)(
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Using the fact that  we can simplify the expression to: FF DCS −=
′
0)(
)1(
)(2 22 >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
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P π
. 
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Step 3. 0)(2
)(
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−
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MER
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K
P π
. 
Proof of Part (i) 
Using Lemma 1 (for i = F) and the fact that , we can write HF DD >
**
)(2
1
F
HFF
HFM
F
ER PKDDD
DDKPP >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
−
+= π . 
Proof of Part (ii) 
As K tends to infinity, PPER tends to: 
⎭⎬
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⎩⎨
⎧
+
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F
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F
F
ER
DD
CSCS
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π
2
1
lim . 
To compare  with  as defined in (2), we first define the following auxiliary 
function: 
ERPlim
*
HP
)(
)()(
ZD
CSZCSZZf
M
−
+= .  
We can now write ( )lim 12
M
ER
F
H
P f C
D
π⎧ ⎫
= +⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
  and ( )* 1
2
M
H H
H
P f C
D
π⎧ ⎫
= +⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
.  Now, 
using CS’(Z) = −D(Z) and since Z < PM, we have that: 
[ ]2
( ) ( )
( ) 0.
( )
MD Z CS Z CS
f Z
D Z
′ ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦
′ = − >  
This implies ( )Ff C < ( )Hf C  since CF < CH. This implies that  < . Given that 
P
ERPlim
*
HP
P
ER is increasing in K, PERP  −  < 0, *HP K∀ . 
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The fact that  also implies that the difference R =  −  decreases as C0)( >′ Zf *HP ERPlim F 
tends to CH. Therefore, the difference between PP
** ER
),,( KCCΔ ERPP =*
ER and  decreases monotonically 
as C  tends to C . 
*
HP
F H
Proof of Proposition 5 
Define  We need to prove that 
> 0. Suppose first that K = 0. In this case  and therefore 
).(),,( HFHHFFHF KDDPKDPDPKCC +−+=Δ
HF F
( ) .0)0,,( =−=Δ FERFHF DPPCC *  Hence it suffices to prove that K∂Δ∂ > 0. That is, 
we need: 
 HERHFHH DPKKDDDPK −∂+−=∂
Δ∂ )(*
ERP∂
 
 .0)()( * >∂+−−= KKDDDPP HFH
ER
H
∂PER
 
Substituting  from Lemma 3,  from Lemma 1, and the formula of ERP *HP K∂
PER∂
 
derived in step 3 of the the proof of Proposition 4 we obtain: 
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where f (Z) is as defined in the proof of Proposition 4. It is easy to check that the 
expression in brackets in the second term of the last expression is zero. The 
expression in brackets in the first term is positive since  as shown in the 
proof of Proposition 4. 
0)( >′ Zf
Proof of Lemma 6 
If p1 < C then  Π( p1) < (½)C so Π( p1) - < SQΠ
( )21
2 8
C t
C
t
+
− =
( )2
0.
8
C t
t
−
− <  
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Proof of Lemma 7 
Step 1. Show that the firm accepts the H’s ER price if it is above 
( )2
4
Ht C
t
+
  
.  
def
=
MINp1
To accept the price p1 offered under ER, the firm must make more profits by being 
listed at this price (so consumers pay CH) than competing at an unsubsidized price 
with the rival, whose consumers pay CH. This can be written as 
( )
t
tCp H
82
2
1 +> . 
Step 2. Assume that condition (14) holds. Show that the solution of the NBP in 
country F is above . MINp1
It is easy to show that, when the firm rejects the ER offer by H, the NBP in F has the 
same objective function as under IPN in F. Hence if the solution under IPN in F, or 
, lies above  then the solution to the whole NBP under ER is indeed above 
. Hence, using (13) for C = C
IPN
Fp1
MINp1
MINp1 F and p2 = p2F, we 
require ( ) ( ) ( )
t
pCtCt
t
Ct FFFH
44
2
22
−++
<
+ . This is equivalent to condition (14).  
Step 3. We can now present the Nash Bargaining Problem: 
 ( )( ) ( )SQHSQFSQFF
pp
pHpHMax
MIN
Π−Π−+−
≥
11 ln2
1ln
2
1
11
. 
Step 4. Use the first order conditions of this problem to obtain (15).  
Proof of Proposition 8 
Let  be given by the formula for  once applied to country F, that is, the one 
given by (13) after substituting C by C
IPN
Fp1 IPNp1
F and  by . Then  can be rewritten 
as  
SQΠ SQFΠ
ERp1
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( ) IPNFSQFSQHER pp 11 21 +Π−Π= . 
Since  is an increasing function of C, we have  <  when CSQΠ SQFΠ
SQ
HΠ H > CF. 
Therefore  > . ERp1 IPNFp1
Moreover, to show that >  we write the difference  as follows: IPNHp1 ERp1 ERIPNH pp 11 −
( )SQFSQHIPNFIPNHERIPNH pppp Π−Π−−=− 211111 . 
To show that this difference is always positive, first show that it is positive when 
evaluated at CH = CF; then show that this difference is increasing in CH. 
When CH = CF,  and , which is positive by 
Assumption 3. 
SQ
F
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−∂ , 
which is positive by part (iii) of Assumption 2. 
We use a similar technical argument to show that . 
We rewrite the difference using (11) as  
( ) ( ) ( ERIPNHIPNF ppp 111 2Π>Π+Π )
( ) ( ) ( ) )2(212 111111 ERIPNHIPNFERIPNHIPNF pppppp −+=Π−Π+Π  
( ) ( )SQFSQHIPNFIPNH pp Π−Π−−= 2121 11 . 
We show that it is positive when evaluated at CH = CF and that it is increasing in CH. 
When CH = CF,  and ΠSQF
SQ
H Π=Π ( ) ( ) ( )ERIPNHIPNF ppp 111 2Π−Π+ ( )IPNFIPNH pp 1121 −= , 
which is positive by Assumption 3. This difference is increasing in CH: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) t pCtCCpC ppp HHH
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12 21111 −+
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−∂
∂
=∂
Π−Π+Π∂ , 
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which is positive by part (iii) of Assumption 2. 
Proof of Proposition 9 
The proof of Proposition 9 is available upon request from the authors. 
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TABLES 
 
(Patients’ price, firm’s 
price) 
ER with weak threats ER with tough threats 
Negotiations in F succeed and 
the firm accepts ER 
(CF, PF) in F and (CH, PF) in H 
Negotiations in F succeed but 
the firm rejects ER 
(CF, PF) in F and (PH, PH) in H (CF, PF) in F and no sales in H 
Negotiations in F fail ER not proposed, product 
delisted in both countries: 
(PF, PF) in F and (PH, PH) in H 
 
No sales in either country 
 
Table I: The types of ER by agency H. 
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LEGENDS 
 
Table I: The types of ER by agency H. 
Figure 1. Comparing independent price negotiations ( *iP ) to weak-threats ER (PP
ER) 
as country H’s size (K) increases relative to country F’s. The value of R is derived in 
the Appendix (proof of Proposition 4). It decreases as C   increases.  F
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Figure 1. Comparing independent price negotiations ( *iP ) to weak-threats ER (PP
ER) 
as country H’s size (K) increases relative to country F’s. The value of R is derived in 
the Appendix (proof of Proposition 4). It decreases as C   increases. F
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